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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-4315
________________
STRATTON NEAL PEAY,
                    Appellant
   v.
FREDERICA MASSIAH-JACKSON; JAMES FITZGERALD, III;
D. WEBSTER KEOGH; JOSEPH LATZALOTTI; LYNNE ABRAHAM; JEFFREY
BEARD
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-04248)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction 
or for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
May 12, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed May 26, 2005 )
____________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Stratton Neal Peay filed this appeal, but he originally did not pay the applicable
fees or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  Therefore, his appeal was dismissed
Peay’s District Court case originally was administratively closed because Peay1
had not paid the filing fee or filed for in forma pauperis status.    
pursuant to LAR 3.3 and LAR Misc. 107.1(a).  Peay then filed a “motion for rehearing”
that the Clerk’s Office construed as a motion to reopen his appeal and denied without
prejudice to a renewed motion after the filing and docketing fees were paid or an
application to proceed in forma pauperis was filed.  Peay has filed a renewed motion,
captioned “petition for rehearing,” and a complete application for in forma pauperis
status.  
Peay has shown good cause to reopen his appeal, so his renewed motion to reopen
is granted.  His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also granted, because he has no
appreciable assets.  However, his appeal will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
We have jurisdiction over Peay’s appeal.  Although the District Court ordered
Peay’s case to remain “administratively closed,”  and “an order administratively closing a1
case is not, in and of itself, a final order,”see WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm't, Inc., No. 03-
4094, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5330, at *6 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2005) (citing Penn West
Assocs. Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2004)), the District Court also
dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).  The District Court held that
Peay sought relief unavailable under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973), and
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-9 (1971).  Also, after Peay filed a motion for
reconsideration, the District Court reiterated its reasons for the dismissal, denied
reconsideration, and stated that Peay’s case would remain closed for statistical purposes. 
Additionally, as to his allegation of error in the PCRA proceedings, Peay cannot2
state a claim for a violation of the Sixth Amendment on post-conviction review, cf.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991), and insomuch as he alleged an error
in state law or procedure relating to his request to represent himself in those proceedings,
he cannot be afforded relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See, e.g., Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d
488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Section 1983 created a federal cause of action for damages to
vindicate alleged violations of federal law . . . .”).  We stress that the District Court’s
dismissal of any state-law claims was without prejudice to renewal in an appropriate state
forum.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2005).  
Therefore, Peay appeals from a final order.  Cf. Penn West Assocs. Inc., 371 F.3d at 124.
However, Peay’s appeal of the orders dismissing his case and denying his motion
for reconsideration is legally frivolous.  In his complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, Peay alleged that he was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned in violation of
federal constitutional law.  He also claimed that, against his wishes, counsel had been
appointed to represent him in Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)
proceedings.  He contended that, because he has not been permitted to proceed pro se, he
has missed hearings and has failed to get a response to documents he filed without his
attorney’s assistance in the PCRA court.  Therefore, he sought an injunction to require the
state court to rule on his self-authored amended PCRA petition and to permit him to
proceed pro se.  He also claimed that he was being framed for a state crime that he did not
commit, and sought an order to dismiss the state charges.    
To the extent that Peay challenged the proceedings leading up to his conviction, or
the fact or duration of his imprisonment, his claims were not cognizable in an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994);
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.  To the extent that Peay sought an injunction to force the PCRA
courts to allow him to proceed pro se  or to bar a pending state criminal proceeding,2
Younger and its progeny barred such relief.  See 401 U.S. at 43-9.  
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2005).
